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THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE: WHY GIBBONS v. OGDEN 
SHOULD BE RESTORED TO THE CANON 
NORMAN R. WILLIAMS* 
The dormant Commerce Clause is preoccupied with state economic 
protectionism.  As young lawyers learn, the Supreme Court has applied a 
virtually fatal form of strict scrutiny to state laws that discriminate against 
interstate commerce and a more forgiving balancing test that practically 
rubber-stamps other laws that only incidentally affect interstate commerce.1  
Pressed to identify the theoretical justification for the “dormant” component of 
the Commerce Clause and the Court’s doctrinal focus on state protectionism, 
defenders of the modern doctrine point to Justice Jackson’s famous defense of 
the dormant Commerce Clause in H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond.2  In it, 
Justice Jackson discussed at some length how the history of internecine 
commercial warfare among the states following the Revolutionary War was 
one of the salient events prompting the Constitutional Convention of 1787 and 
leading the framers to vest the commerce power in Congress.3 
Few individuals are proponents of state economic protectionism (at least 
overtly so), and therefore Justice Jackson’s defense of the dormant Commerce 
Clause finds a sympathetic audience among scholars and students alike.  
Nevertheless, conceptualizing the dormant Commerce Clause solely as an anti-
protectionist constitutional safeguard poses several problems, and they are 
significant.  First, Justice Jackson’s anti-protectionist defense of the dormant 
Commerce Clause is not formally rooted in the constitutional text—a feature 
 
* Assistant Professor of Law, Willamette University College of Law.  A.B., Harvard University; 
J.D. New York University School of Law.  I thank Brannon Denning, Joel Goldstein, Hans Linde, 
and William Nelson for their instructive comments on previous drafts of this essay. 
 1. Compare City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978) (applying a 
“virtually per se rule of invalidity” to laws that discriminate against interstate commerce), with 
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (holding that laws which only incidentally 
affect interstate commerce will be upheld “unless the burden imposed on such commerce is 
clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits”).  See also C & A Carbone, Inc. v. 
Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 390 (1994) (summarizing modern test). 
 2. 336 U.S. 525 (1949).  For the most recent example of this phenomenon, see Granholm v. 
Heald, Nos. 03-1116, 03-1120, 03-1274, slip op. at 8 (U.S. May 16, 2005), in which the Court 
invoked the Hood anti-protectionism principle to invalidate several states’ discriminatory wine 
shipment laws. 
 3. 336 U.S. at 533–34. 
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that critics of the doctrine have been quick to seize upon.  Justice Scalia, for 
example, has been particularly critical of the dormant Commerce Clause, 
disparaging the “lack of any clear theoretical underpinning” for the doctrine.4  
Perhaps Mark Tushnet is right that the historical underpinning of the doctrine 
trumps the absence of an express textual foundation—that the Court is merely 
fulfilling an unstated but immanent constitutional aversion to state 
parochialism5—but students cannot help but wonder that there isn’t some 
better way to ground such a central feature of our constitutional landscape as 
the dormant Commerce Clause. 
Second, as a doctrinal matter, the anti-protectionist justification for the 
dormant Commerce Clause cannot be easily squared with the Court’s modern 
case law.  For example, the anti-protectionist theory immediately calls into 
question the legitimacy of the Pike balancing test that is applicable to non-
discriminatory state legislation.6  What plausible anti-protectionist justification 
could there be for having courts police non-discriminatory legislation?  Not 
surprisingly, the absence of a ready-made answer to this question has led 
several Justices and commentators to call for the abandonment of the Pike 
test.7  So too, the anti-protectionist reading of the dormant Commerce Clause 
cannot be easily reconciled with the “market participant” exception, which 
provides that states may favor in-state economic interests in the distribution of 
state-owned resources,8 or with the exemption for state monetary subsidies for 
in-state interests.9  Courts find no constitutional problem, for example, with a 
state reserving the production of cement from a state-owned factory solely for 
in-state construction projects10 or with a state providing a lucrative subsidy for 
 
 4. Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Washington State Dept. of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 260 (1987) 
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. 
v. Town of Harrison, Me., 520 U.S. 564, 619–20 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (contesting the 
validity of the dormant Commerce Clause). 
 5. Mark V. Tushnet, Scalia and the Dormant Commerce Clause: A Foolish Formalism?, 12 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1717, 1724 (1990). 
 6. Pike, 397 U.S. at 142 (“Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a 
legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will 
be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the 
putative local benefits.”). 
 7. Itel Containers Int’l Corp. v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. 60, 79 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring 
in part and concurring in the judgment); Camps Newfound/Owatonna, 520 U.S. at 619–20 
(Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 8. South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 93 (1984). 
 9. See New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988) (suggesting that direct 
subsidy is permissible under the dormant Commerce Clause). 
 10. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 438–39 (1980). 
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businesses headquartered in the state.11  Yet, both types of actions are patently 
protectionist. 
This incongruence between theory and doctrine generates some fairly 
predictable reactions among students.  Some, who embrace the theory, 
advocate amending the doctrine to bring it in line with the theory.  Others, who 
like the doctrine, search for a different or more complete theory to justify the 
doctrine.  Still others view the dormant Commerce Clause as a naked, 
illegitimate act of judicial legislation that should be consigned to the proverbial 
trash heap of history. 
In my view, these views are the unfortunate byproduct of the conventional 
account’s preoccupation with state economic protectionism.  While the dangers 
of such economic protectionism are not to be ignored or trivialized, much 
could be gained (and much cynicism about the dormant Commerce Clause 
dissipated) by prodding students to consider whether there is some other 
constitutionally-rooted conception of the dormant Commerce Clause.  Of 
course, there is such a conception.  It was first outlined in Gibbons v. Ogden,12 
and, though it has been eclipsed by the modern anti-protectionist theory, it is 
worth considering again. 
Gibbons, as you will recall, involved the validity of New York’s statutory 
grant of an exclusive monopoly to Robert Livingston and Robert Fulton for 
steamboat travel on New York waters.  Aspiring competitors challenged the 
validity of the state-created monopoly, arguing (in what we would later term a 
dormant Commerce Clause claim) that the Commerce Clause of its own force 
divested New York of authority to enact regulations of interstate commerce.13  
The New York Court of Errors, the state’s highest court at the time, rejected 
their constitutional challenge and upheld the monopoly.14  Delivering one of 
the opinions explaining the result, Chief Justice James Kent, no slouch in 
matters of American law, concluded that the power to regulate interstate 
commerce, like the power of taxation, was held concurrently by both the states 
and the federal government and that, therefore, the Commerce Clause did not 
operate as a limit on state authority.15 
A few years after the Court of Errors’ decision, Thomas Gibbons decided 
to challenge the monopoly and began running a steamboat—captained by the 
young Cornelius Vanderbilt, the future railroad tycoon—from New Jersey to 
New York City.  To justify his brazen challenge to the monopoly, Gibbons 
 
 11. New Energy Co., 486 U.S. at 278 (noting that direct subsidies do not “ordinarily” violate 
dormant Commerce Clause).  But cf. Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler, Inc., 386 F.3d 738, 746 (6th Cir. 
2004) (invalidating state investment tax credit for purchases of equipment for in-state use but not 
out-of-state use). 
 12. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). 
 13. Id. at 1. 
 14. Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns. 507 (N.Y. 1812). 
 15. Id. at 576–81 (Kent, C.J.). 
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obtained a federal coasting license pursuant to the federal Navigation Act of 
1793, which he contended gave him the right to enter New York waters despite 
the contrary New York statutes.16  James Kent, now the Chancellor, disagreed, 
concluding that the federal coasting license did not preempt state authority but 
merely served to designate the ships holding such licenses as American in 
character.17  Gibbons appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, and the stage was 
set for a showdown of historic and jurisprudential significance. 
The case, of course, presented the Marshall Court with its first opportunity 
to discuss the meaning of the Commerce Clause.  More importantly, however, 
the lawsuit squarely presented the question whether and to what extent the 
Commerce Clause itself limited state authority.  Indeed, the vast bulk of the 
five-day oral argument focused not on the meaning and significance of the 
federal coasting license but rather on the existence and scope of a dormant 
Commerce Clause divesting states of the power to regulate interstate 
commerce.18 
As we all know, the Court invalidated the steamboat monopoly on the 
ground that the federal coasting license issued pursuant to the federal 
Navigation Act preempted the conflicting New York statutes and authorized 
Gibbons (and any other holder of such license) to enter New York waters in 
order to conduct interstate trade.19  In defending Congress’s power to enact the 
Navigation Act, Marshall elaborated upon the scope of Congress’s commerce 
power.  Marshall’s description was striking in its breadth: “Commerce,” 
Marshall declared, “undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is something more; it is 
intercourse.”20  Moreover, Congress’s power over interstate commerce reached 
into the interior of each state, empowering Congress to regulate those activities 
within a state that “affect the states generally.”21  Only the “completely internal 
commerce of a state” was beyond Congress’s constitutional authority.22  And, 
if that were not enough, Marshall declared that the commerce power was 
plenary; it is “complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and 
acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the constitution.”23  
In fact, Marshall declared that the power over commerce “is vested in 
Congress as absolutely as it would be in a single government”24—an obvious 
rebuke to those proponents of states’ rights who asserted that the federal 
 
 16. Ogden v. Gibbons, 4 Johns. Ch. 150, 153–54 (N.Y. Ch. 1819), aff’d, 17 Johns. 488, 509–
10 (N.Y. 1820). 
 17. Id. at 156–57. 
 18. Norman R. Williams, Gibbons, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1398, 1411–12 (2004). 
 19. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 189 (1824). 
 20. Id. at 189. 
 21. Id. at 195. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 196. 
 24. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 197. 
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government’s powers should be narrowly construed because (in their view) the 
United States was merely a confederation of sovereign states. 
These passages are familiar to students of American constitutional law.  
They provide the grist for discussions of Congress’s affirmative regulatory 
power under the Commerce Clause.  Indeed, these statements from Gibbons 
are often the first materials that students read in their introduction to the 
commerce power.25  And well they should, for Gibbons remains a touchstone 
case with significance for contemporary debates over Congress’s regulatory 
power.26  Unfortunately, these passages are the only materials from Gibbons to 
which students typically are exposed in any significant manner.  When it 
comes time to discuss the dormant Commerce Clause, some casebooks omit 
Gibbons entirely,27 while others relegate it to a prefatory remark.28  Even those 
casebooks that include excerpts from Gibbons in their dormant Commerce 
Clause materials seem interested in the case only for its historical importance; 
after moving on to the more modern decisions, Gibbons and its defense of a 
dormant Commerce Clause are rarely mentioned again.29  In short, Marshall’s 
 
 25. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 103 (2001); JESSE CHOPER ET 
AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES, COMMENTS, QUESTIONS 65–67 (9th ed. 2001); DANIEL A. 
FARBER ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THEMES FOR THE CONSTITUTION’S THIRD CENTURY 
841–44 (3d ed. 2003); LOUIS FISHER, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 329–32 (5th ed. 2003); 
CALVIN MASSEY, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: POWERS AND LIBERTIES 183–85 (2001); 
GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 143–46 (4th ed. 2001); KATHLEEN M. 
SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 124–26 (15th ed. 2004). 
 26. Compare United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 553 (1995) (concluding that Gibbons 
held that commerce power did not extend to “completely internal” commerce and thus established 
a limit on federal power), and id. at 594 (Thomas, J., concurring) (contending that “the principal 
dissent is not the first to misconstrue Gibbons” and citing Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 120 
(1942), as example), with id. at 604 (Souter, J., dissenting) (concluding that Gibbons had 
recognized “broad” federal power over commerce), and id. at 615, 631 (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(concluding that Gibbons recognized federal authority over intrastate commercial activities that 
“significantly affect interstate commerce” and arguing that, had the Court interpreted commerce 
power “as this Court has traditionally interpreted it”—citing Gibbons as an example—it would 
have upheld statute).  See also Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corp. of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 
181 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (accusing Court of ignoring Gibbons in adopting narrow 
interpretation of commerce power); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 616 n.7 (2000) 
(contending its approach is drawn from Gibbons); id. at 641, 646 (Souter, J., dissenting) 
(accusing majority of misreading Gibbons). 
 27. See, e.g., FISHER, supra note 25, at 327–28; CHARLES A. SHANOR, AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: STRUCTURE AND RECONSTRUCTION 414–15 (2d ed. 2001) (beginning 
dormant Commerce Clause discussion without reference to Gibbons). 
 28. See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 25, at 323–24; CHOPER ET AL., supra note 25, at 
207–09; MASSEY, supra note 25, at 271–72; STONE ET AL., supra note 25, at 258–59. 
 29. Though they appear to include it primarily for historical reasons, these editors 
nevertheless should be praised for including a lengthy excerpt from, and discussion of, Gibbons.  
See, e.g., PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 126–33 (4th ed. 2000); WILLIAM COHEN & JONATHAN D. VARAT, CONSTITUTIONAL 
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lengthy and illuminating discussion of the “dormant” or “negative” component 
of the Commerce Clause has been banished from the modern dormant 
Commerce Clause canon and relegated to the status of a mere historical curio. 
Ignoring or minimizing Marshall’s discussion of the dormant Commerce 
Clause is unfortunate because Marshall’s understanding of the dormant 
Commerce Clause differs markedly from the modern view.  Significantly, 
Marshall’s approach was not rooted in a concern about state economic 
protectionism; rather, as Marshall viewed it, the existence of a dormant 
component of the Commerce Clause depended upon the nature of the 
commerce power vested by the Constitution in Congress.  For Marshall, the 
central task confronting the Court was to determine whether the commerce 
power was held concurrently both by the states and federal government (as 
Ogden argued and James Kent had held) or possessed exclusively by Congress 
(as Gibbons argued).30 
To answer that question and determine whether the commerce power was 
exclusive, Marshall began by focusing on the arguments proffered by Ogden in 
support of the concurrent view.31  Marshall was not impressed.  For example, 
Marshall disagreed with the notion that the commerce power was akin to the 
taxation power, which all acknowledged was concurrent in nature.  The 
taxation power, Marshall noted, could be possessed by both sovereigns without 
problem because: 
[t]axation is the simple operation of taking small portions from a perpetually 
accumulating mass, susceptible of almost infinite division; and a power in one 
to take what is necessary for certain purposes, is not, in its nature, incompatible 
with a power in another to take what is necessary for other purposes.32 
In contrast, when a state is attempting to regulate interstate commerce, “it is 
exercising the very power that is granted to Congress, and is doing the very 
thing which Congress is authorized to do.”33 
In a similar fashion, Marshall rejected Ogden’s suggestion that the 
limitations in Article I, Section 10, on the states’ power to levy imposts and 
tonnage duties demonstrated by negative implication that the states retained the 
authority to regulate commerce.  Those constitutional provisions, Marshall 
explained, were adopted to limit the states’ taxation authority and, therefore, 
 
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 145–52 (11th ed. 2001); FARBER ET AL., supra note 25, at 1001–
04; RONALD D. ROTUNDA, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND NOTES 83–90 (7th ed. 
2003); SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 25, at 247–49. 
 30. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 197–98 (1824). 
 31. Id. at 199. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 199–200. 
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did not contemplate that the states retained some concurrent power over 
interstate commerce.34 
But what about all of the various regulatory laws, such as health inspection 
laws, that the states had adopted?  They were manifestly not adopted pursuant 
to the states’ taxation authority.  Did not their existence and uncontested 
validity demonstrate that the states retained the power to regulate interstate 
commerce?  Marshall’s answer was no, and his explanation formed the early 
framework for assessing dormant Commerce Clause challenges.  Marshall 
acknowledged that many state laws could affect interstate commerce, but he 
disputed that those laws were enacted pursuant to a commerce power.  Rather, 
such laws stemmed from the states’ “system of police” or police powers, which 
were retained by the states as a means of providing for the health and safety of 
their citizens.35  Marshall conceded that such police laws might look similar to 
commercial regulations adopted by Congress, but he disagreed that any 
similarity in form demonstrated a similarity in origin.  As Marshall put it, 
[a]ll experience shows that the same measures, or measures scarcely 
distinguishable from each other, may flow from distinct powers; but this does 
not prove that the powers themselves are identical. Although the means used in 
their execution may sometimes approach each other so nearly as to be 
confounded, there are other situations in which they are sufficiently distinct to 
establish their individuality.36 
Unpersuaded by Ogden’s arguments in favor of a concurrent theory of the 
commerce power,37 Marshall turned to Gibbons’s argument in favor of the 
exclusive theory, which he thought had “great force.”38 Summarizing 
Gibbons’s claim, Marshall stated that as 
the word “to regulate” implies in its nature, full power over the thing to be 
regulated, it excludes, necessarily, the action of all others that would perform 
the same operation on the same thing.  That regulation is designed for the 
entire result, applying to those parts which remain as they were, as well as to 
those which are altered.  It produces a uniform whole, which is as much 
 
 34. Id. at 200–03. 
 35. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 204. 
 36. Id. 
 37. In addition to the claims discussed in the text, Marshall also rejected other arguments 
proffered by Ogden in favor of a concurrent commercial power.  See id. at 205–07 (rejecting 
inference of concurrent power from the Slave Immigration Clause of Article I, Section 9); id. at 
207–08 (rejecting inference from congressional statute authorizing federal agents to enforce state 
quarantine laws).  These are interesting and important points, but, in my experience, students 
without a deep grounding in American history find it difficult to understand Ogden’s arguments 
and Marshall’s responses on these points. 
 38. Id. at 209. 
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disturbed and deranged by changing what the regulating power designs to 
leave untouched, as that on which it has operated.39 
Marshall’s sympathy for the dormant Commerce Clause was manifest, but, 
somewhat surprisingly, Marshall announced that the Court did not have to 
formally decide the matter because the New York statutes were preempted by 
the federal Navigation Act.40  Given his extended discussion and refutation of 
the “concurrent” view of the commerce power espoused by Ogden, it is 
striking to say the least that Marshall did not rest the decision at least in part on 
the dormant Commerce Clause.  I have explored the reasons for Marshall’s 
hedge at length elsewhere,41 but for present purposes it is important to note 
only that Marshall provided an extended discussion of the theoretical 
justification for a dormant Commerce Clause—that the commerce power was 
necessarily exclusive in nature.  Further, he had begun to sketch the contours 
of such a doctrine—that the validity of a state law depended upon whether it 
was a commercial regulation or a police regulation. 
Perhaps even more illuminating in some respects is Justice Johnson’s 
concurrence.  Johnson disagreed with Marshall and the Court that the federal 
Navigation Act had anything to do with the case.42  Rather, Johnson would 
have rested the decision solely on the dormant Commerce Clause, which he 
expressly concluded divested the states of authority over interstate commerce 
because of the exclusive nature of the commerce power.43  Critically, Johnson 
justified the exclusivity of Congress’s commerce power in part by focusing on 
the internecine commercial warfare among the states in the wake of the 
Revolutionary War, which, Johnson noted, prompted the framers to vest in 
Congress the commerce power.44  Thus, more than a century before Justice 
Jackson, Johnson had identified the framers’ hostility to state protectionism as 
a core ingredient of the commerce power, but, unlike Jackson, Johnson did not 
read the Commerce Clause as itself embodying an anti-protectionist limitation 
on state authority.  Rather, Johnson saw these historical events as a 
justification for the much broader proposition that the states were divested of 
all authority over interstate commerce, whether exercised for protectionist 
purposes or not.  Further bolstering his view of the exclusive nature of the 
commerce power, Johnson pointed to the fact that the Commerce Clause also 
 
 39. Id. 
 40. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.). 
 41. Williams, supra note 18, at 1450–76. 
 42. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 231–33. 
 43. Id. at 227 (“[T]he power must be exclusive; it can reside but in one potentate; and hence, 
the grant of this power carries with it the whole subject, leaving nothing for the State to act 
upon.”). 
 44. Id. at 223–25. 
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vested Congress with power over foreign commerce, which everyone agreed 
was necessarily exclusive.45 
Lastly, Johnson attempted to provide some guidance as to how to 
distinguish between constitutional and unconstitutional state laws.  Like 
Marshall, Johnson acknowledged that the states retained authority to adopt 
inspection and other laws pursuant to their police powers.  According to 
Johnson, the key to distinguishing between the two types of laws lay in the 
legislative purpose animating the state act.46  To be sure, Johnson 
acknowledged the lack of certainty inherent in such a test: “The line cannot be 
drawn with sufficient distinctness between the municipal powers of the one, 
and the commercial powers of the other.  In some points they meet and blend 
so as scarcely to admit of separation.”47  Yet, he remained convinced that the 
Constitution required such line-drawing and that the New York statutes were 
clearly on the commercial side of the line. 
Obviously, Gibbons provides a much different account and justification for 
the dormant Commerce Clause than the modern doctrine.  While the latter is 
preoccupied with state economic protectionism,48 Gibbons views the dormant 
component of the Commerce Clause as a necessary byproduct of our federal 
system of government.  Stated differently, the modern, anti-protectionist 
account conceives of the dormant Commerce Clause as a protection against a 
particularly noxious form of state legislation, a sort of rights-based conception 
that views individuals as holding a right to trade interstate free of state 
protectionist-motivated interference, while Marshall and Johnson’s approach 
treats the doctrine as a function of the division of power between the federal 
government and the states, a powers-based conception that is concerned only 
indirectly with the impact of state legislation upon individual interests. 
OK, but why should students in the twenty-first century read the 
nineteenth-century decision in Gibbons in conjunction with their study of the 
dormant Commerce Clause?  There are several reasons.  First, restoring 
Gibbons to the constitutional law canon provides students with a more robust 
understanding of the historical development of the dormant Commerce Clause.  
As many casebook editors have acknowledged, that is important in and of 
itself,49 but it also has the collateral benefit of bolstering the doctrine’s 
perceived legitimacy.  Much of the students’ skepticism about the doctrine’s 
legitimacy derives from their perception that the dormant Commerce Clause is 
a relatively recent development.  The modern doctrine and its preoccupation 
 
 45. Id. at 228–29. 
 46. Id. at 235 (“Their different purposes mark the distinction between the powers brought 
into action; and while frankly exercised, they can produce no serious collision.”). 
 47. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 238. 
 48. See, e.g., Granholm v. Heald, Nos. 03-1116, 03-1120, 03-1274 (U.S. May 16, 2005) 
(invalidating discriminatory wine shipment laws as protectionist). 
 49. See supra note 29. 
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with state economic protectionism did not fully emerge until after World War 
II—indeed, Justice Jackson’s anti-protectionist defense was offered only in 
1949.50  Left without any exposure to the earlier materials, astute students are 
sure to wonder why such a central feature of our constitutional order as a 
prohibition on state protectionism would take more than 150 years for the 
Court to recognize and implement.51 
Gibbons, however, was decided less than forty years after the 
Constitutional Convention.  Once students learn that the dormant Commerce 
Clause has such deep historical roots, they are less likely to perceive the 
doctrine as some illegitimate invention.  Moreover, the fact that the existence 
of the dormant component of the Commerce Clause dates back to the first case 
to discuss the Clause imbues the doctrine with added legitimacy.  The dormant 
Commerce Clause was not some late embellishment, but an original 
component of the Supreme Court’s understanding of the Commerce Clause. 
Second, Gibbons provides an alternative way of thinking about the 
dormant Commerce Clause.  The modern account’s focus on anti-
protectionism appeals to students’ antipathy to state parochialism, but there are 
other constitutional provisions that seem better suited (and more expressly 
tailored) to policing against state economic protectionism: the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause of Article IV;52 the Import-Export Clause of Article I, 
Section 10;53 and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.54  
 
 50. To be sure, there were references to economic protectionism in the Court’s dormant 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence before World War II.  See, e.g., Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 
275, 280–82 (1875).  Indeed, as noted above, Justice Johnson in Gibbons drew upon this 
antipathy to economic protectionism to justify the dormant Commerce Clause.  Yet, the Court’s 
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine during that time did not focus on the presence or absence of 
state protectionism in assessing the constitutionality of state legislation.  Rather, even while 
professing concern about state protectionism, the Court instead asked whether the challenged 
state legislation indirectly or directly regulated commerce—an inquiry with no perceivable 
connection to rooting out state protectionism. 
 51. Including Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851), dispels some of 
the students’ skepticism; Cooley, after all, was decided little over sixty years after the framing.  
Including Cooley, however, does not substitute for a discussion of Gibbons.  Not only was 
Gibbons decided a full generation before Cooley, Justice Curtis’s discussion of the dormant 
Commerce Clause in Cooley was modeled upon Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in Gibbons.  
Only by examining the latter can students appreciate the former. 
 52. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1 (“The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all 
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”). 
 53. The Import-Export Clause states: 
No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or 
Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing it’s [sic] inspection Laws: and 
the net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on Imports or Exports, shall be for the 
Use of the Treasury of the United States; and all such Laws shall be subject to the Revision and 
Controul of the Congress. 
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Viewing the dormant Commerce Clause in anti-protectionist terms renders it 
little more than a largely, though not exclusively, redundant feature of the 
constitutional landscape.55 
Gibbons offers a different conception of the dormant Commerce Clause.  
Rather than focus on whether a state measure discriminates against interstate 
commerce, Gibbons instructs courts to assess whether the measure is 
commercial or municipal in nature—that is, whether it was adopted to protect 
the health, safety, or welfare of the people or to promote some commercial 
interest.  Of course, to say that it provides a different account of the dormant 
Commerce Clause is not to say that it provides a superior account.  There is 
much to be said in favor of the anti-protectionist theory—state economic 
protectionism finds few serious academic defenders—but there is also much to 
be said in favor of the exclusivity theory.  And even those who agree with 
Justice Jackson’s account may nevertheless find value in exploring whether 
some elements of Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion should be retained as part 
of the modern doctrine. 
Third, Gibbons clarifies some of the “oddities” of the modern doctrine.  
Indeed, there is much more of Gibbons lurking in the substrate of the modern 
doctrine than one might suppose.  For one, take the Pike balancing test for non-
discriminatory state legislation.  According to the anti-protectionist reading of 
the dormant Commerce Clause, there is no justification for the continued use 
of the Pike test.  If a state measure does not distinguish between intrastate and 
interstate commerce, it is not protectionist and, therefore, presumptively 
permissible.  In contrast, an exclusive commerce power condemns both 
discriminatory and non-discriminatory state commercial legislation.  As noted 
above, the key task is in distinguishing between municipal and commercial 
measures.  The Pike test’s condemnation of state laws whose burdens on 
interstate commerce clearly outweigh the local benefits is perhaps one way of 
distinguishing between commercial and municipal measures.  If a measure 
 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2; see also Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 
520 U.S. 564, 621–37 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (urging reinterpretation of Import-Export 
Clause to bar discriminatory state taxation of interstate commerce). 
 54. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”); see also Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 
869, 883 (1985) (holding that Equal Protection Clause prohibits state from imposing higher 
premium tax upon insurance policies issued by out-of-state insurance companies). 
 55. The anti-protectionist scope of the dormant Commerce Clause is broader than that of the 
Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause, which (as currently interpreted) protects only 
citizens and not corporations.  Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 177–78 (1868) (holding 
that corporations are not citizens within meaning of Privilege and Immunities Clause).  So too, it 
is broader than that of the Import-Export Clause, which (as currently interpreted) applies only to 
state taxes and then only to state taxes on foreign, not interstate, goods.  Woodruff v. Parham, 75 
U.S. 123, 136 (1868) (holding that Import-Export Clause does not apply to state tax on interstate 
goods). 
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generates few local benefits when compared to its burdens on interstate 
commerce, it may be safe to conclude that the measure was not adopted to 
promote the health, safety, or welfare of the people, but rather to promote one 
commercial interest at the expense of some other commercial interest.  Thus, 
for example, the fact that there are no health or safety benefits accruing from a 
state’s requirement that all cantaloupes grown in the state be packaged before 
shipment suggests that the real purpose of the requirement was to foster certain 
industries (e.g., agricultural packers) at the expense of other commercial 
interests (e.g., farmers).56  That may or may not be desirable, but it is a choice 
best left to Congress and, according to Marshall, a task exclusively assigned to 
Congress. 
Moreover, the exclusivity theory also provides some basis for the market 
participant exception.  Recall that on a purely anti-protectionist reading of the 
dormant Commerce Clause, the market participant exception is troubling since 
it authorizes states to nourish and act upon protectionist concerns in 
distributing state-owned resources or funds.  An exclusive commerce power, 
however, divests the states only of their authority to regulate interstate 
commerce; their authority to manage state-owned resources is a separate power 
that was not transferred to the federal government by virtue of the adoption of 
the Commerce Clause.  Indeed, only if one buys into the exclusivity theory 
does that exception’s critical distinction between the state acting in a 
regulatory versus proprietary capacity make any sense whatsoever. 
Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, Gibbons helps illuminate and 
provide a way of thinking about the ultimate constitutional issue underlying the 
Commerce Clause (and all questions of federalism)—namely, how does the 
Constitution allocate powers between the federal government and states?  With 
regard to interstate commerce, the Court’s answer in Gibbons was that the 
Constitution entrusted the regulation of interstate commerce exclusively to 
Congress but allowed the states to continue to adopt police regulations to 
protect the health, safety, and welfare of their citizens, even if such regulations 
incidentally affected interstate commerce.  To modern lawyers, the Court’s 
categorical approach is overly formalistic and impossibly vague in practice.  
Nevertheless, it focuses the students on the key problem confronting a federal 
system of government: defining the respective roles of the two sovereigns.  
Once they understand that this is the central task, they have a better foundation 
for assessing the various doctrinal tests that come later.  The distinction 
between “national” and “local” matters announced by the Court in Cooley v. 
Board of Wardens57 can be seen as a well-meaning elaboration upon Gibbons, 
though ultimately no more definitive in practice.  Meanwhile, the balancing 
 
 56. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 143 (1970) (noting that state packaging 
requirement does not promote safety or consumer fairness). 
 57. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851). 
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test from Southern Pacific Company v. Arizona58 is utterly useless, not just 
because it is vague, but because it does not seem even remotely linked to 
distinguishing between the respective spheres of sovereignty.  More 
fundamentally, however, students can then appreciate that the same task 
ultimately underlies all of the various federalism provisions of the 
Constitution, including the “affirmative” Commerce Clause.  Is a prohibition 
on the possession of a firearm near a school a regulation of commerce (which 
Congress may adopt), a purely municipal measure (which only a state may 
adopt), or a mixture of both (which a state may adopt pending the passage of 
federal legislation preempting or superseding state authority)? 
I do not mean to suggest that Gibbons and its exclusivity theory are the be-
all, end-all of the dormant Commerce Clause, but these benefits are 
considerable and sufficient to warrant Gibbons’s inclusion in a significant 
manner in the Constitutional Law curriculum.  Before rushing to judgment, 
however, perhaps we should consider why some might dispute the value of 
teaching Gibbons. 
One might discount Marshall’s discussion of the dormant Commerce 
Clause as pure dicta, but the benefit of including Gibbons does not depend on 
whether its discussion of the dormant Commerce Clause is good law or even 
law.  Rather, its value lies in its description and argumentative defense of its 
proposed interpretation of the Commerce Clause.  Perhaps Marshall’s 
discussion of the dormant Commerce Clause has no more jurisprudential force 
than the Federalist Papers, but no one disputes the propriety of assigning the 
Federalist Papers despite their status as non-law.  It is their argumentative 
value, not their jurisprudential status, that merits their inclusion in a 
Constitutional Law class.  So too with Gibbons. 
Moreover, this dicta objection proves too much: were we to exclude 
Gibbons on this ground, we would also be forced to exclude several other 
dormant Commerce Clause cases that are routinely taught, notably Cooley.  
Indeed, instructors often forget that Cooley upheld Philadelphia’s pilot 
ordinance, making Justice Curtis’s ruminations about what might offend the 
Commerce Clause dicta as well.59  Rather, in Gibbons’s (or Cooley’s) place, 
we would be forced to substitute the Passenger Cases,60 the first Supreme 
Court decision to hold a state law (a local ordinance in that case) 
unconstitutional because of the dormant Commerce Clause.  I pity the poor 
 
 58. 325 U.S. 761, 770–71 (1945). 
 59. In Cooley, Justice Curtis suggested that the Commerce Clause restricted state authority 
over matters of “national” importance but left the states with control over “local” matters.  53 
U.S. at 319.  Justice Curtis did not give an extended defense of his proposed rule because he was 
drawing upon Gibbons and its progeny; his “national” versus “local” distinction was simply his 
way of elaborating what he took to be the rule pronounced by Marshall in Gibbons. 
 60. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849). 
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students (and instructors) forced to wade through and make sense of the 
various and lengthy seriatim opinions rendered in that case. 
On a different note, some might dispute that Gibbons provides a 
sufficiently valuable discussion of the dormant Commerce Clause to warrant 
inclusion in a significant manner.  That is, they might challenge Marshall’s 
exclusivity theory on its merits, arguing that we should not teach a theory that 
is (in their view) erroneous or unhelpful.  There are a number of merits-based 
objections to the exclusivity theory.  Some challenge the exclusivity theory on 
theoretical grounds.  For example, Justices Scalia and Thomas have argued that 
federal and state authority cannot be coterminous and mutually exclusive in the 
way that Gibbons seems to indicate.61  They argue that, given the expansive 
scope of Congress’s modern commerce power, treating Congress’s power as 
exclusive would substantially restrict state regulatory authority, allowing states 
to regulate only those matters outside Congressional power (such as possession 
of guns near schools).  Others might point out that, as a descriptive matter, 
Gibbons does not solve all of the puzzles lurking in the doctrine.  For example, 
Congress may overrule the Court’s dormant Commerce Clause decisions and 
restore state authority to regulate in ways that would otherwise run afoul of the 
doctrine.62  Far from explaining this doctrinal feature, Gibbons calls it into 
question.63  And still others might object that, as a doctrinal matter, Marshall’s 
formalistic distinction between commercial and municipal measures is 
impossibly vague and incapable of judicial enforcement. 
As an initial matter, I view the substance of these criticisms as overblown.  
For example, Justices Scalia and Thomas’s charge that the exclusivity theory 
cannot be reconciled with the expansive scope of the commerce power ignores 
the possibility of a selectively exclusive commerce power.  The commerce 
power need not be exclusive over the entire domain of regulatory actions 
within its scope.  Indeed, in Gibbons, Daniel Webster and William Wirt, the 
counsel for Gibbons, argued only for a selectively exclusive commerce 
power.64  Admittedly, defining the scope of the exclusive portion of the 
commerce power would, of course, entail some difficulty.  What is so 
necessarily federal in nature so as to fall within the exclusive portion of the 
commerce power versus what is not so essential so as to fall into the 
concurrent portion?  But one should not be too fast to pooh-pooh the idea of a 
 
 61. Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Washington State Dep’t of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 261 (1987) 
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town 
of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 614 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 62. See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 431 (1946). 
 63. See Norman R. Williams, Why Congress May Not “Overrule” the Dormant Commerce 
Clause, 53 UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming 2005) (arguing that, correctly interpreted, the Commerce 
Clause does not empower Congress to overrule dormant Commerce Clause limitations on state 
authority). 
 64. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 165 (1824). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2005] THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE 831 
selectively exclusive commerce power.  Indeed, that is precisely what we have 
today as a practical matter: Congress’s affirmative regulatory power is much 
broader than the scope of the judicially enforceable dormant Commerce 
Clause.65 
Nor is there much force to the objection that the exclusivity theory fails to 
account for the modern doctrine.  That is undoubtedly true, but it hardly seems 
a valid reason for ignoring Gibbons.  The anti-protectionist theory also fails to 
account for several significant features of the modern doctrine, such as the Pike 
balancing test and the market participant exception. 
Similarly, the objection that the exclusivity theory is too difficult to apply 
in practice has some truth to it but not enough to warrant ignoring the theory 
entirely.  Distinguishing between commercial and municipal regulations is no 
easy task, but the modern doctrine also requires courts to perform a fairly 
difficult job.  For example, although one might think that identifying facial 
discrimination would be simple, the Court has confused matters by holding 
that some municipal laws that favor municipal residents constitute 
discrimination against out-of-state citizens.66  Worse still, the Court’s efforts in 
determining when facially neutral state laws have a discriminatory intent or 
effect befuddle even the most acute observers.67  And, of course, the Pike 
balancing test as applied by the Court is simply a bog.68  Thus, both the anti-
protectionist and exclusivity theories require courts to engage in difficult line-
drawing. 
More fundamentally, though, all of these merits-based objections are 
ultimately beside the point.  I am not arguing that Gibbons fully accounts for 
 
 65. Compare Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942) (holding that commerce power 
authorizes Congress to regulate intrastate activities that have “substantial economic effect” upon 
interstate commerce), with CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 87–88 (1987) 
(holding that dormant Commerce Clause prevents states from adopting regulations that 
discriminate against or impermissibly burden interstate commerce). 
 66. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 391–92 (1994); Dean Milk 
Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951). 
 67. Compare, e.g., Hunt v. Washington State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 351–52 
(1977) (holding that state requirement that apples packaged in closed containers list only the 
USDA grade markings—thereby barring containers listing other state-determined grades—in 
effect discriminated against apples from Washington), with Exxon Corp. v. Maryland, 437 U.S. 
117, 125–26 (1978) (holding that state prohibition on petroleum refiners from operating retail gas 
stations in state did not in effect discriminate against interstate commerce, even though all 
refiners affected by the statute were out-of-state and most retailers that benefited from the statute 
were in-state). 
 68. Compare CTS Corp., 481 U.S. at 91–94 (upholding state law providing that acquirer of 
control shares of domestic corporation in tender offer does not thereby acquire voting rights of 
such shares unless approved by owners of majority of disinterested shares), with Edgar v. MITE 
Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 643–46 (1982) (invalidating state law regulating tender offers for stock of 
domestic corporations as imposing excessive burden on interstate commerce in relation to local 
benefits). 
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and justifies the dormant Commerce Clause, that it provides a perfectly 
coherent, normatively attractive, easily workable, and descriptively accurate 
conception of the dormant Commerce Clause.  Rather, my goal is a more 
modest one: to demonstrate that there is pedagogical value in restoring 
Gibbons to the Constitutional Law canon taught in American law schools.  The 
choice between the two frameworks—the anti-protectionist and exclusivity 
theories—is a comparative one.  Even if one prefers the anti-protectionist 
account, there is surely value for the reasons discussed above in discussing 
Gibbons. 
Lastly, one might argue that, well, all the foregoing is true, but there are so 
many dormant Commerce Clause cases, and there is so little time in the typical 
Constitutional Law class.  Gibbons might be interesting, but there are many 
interesting cases, and we cannot cover every single one.  Under the 
circumstances, surely it is reasonable to focus on the modern cases, which (so 
the argument goes) drive contemporary doctrine. 
I am not unsympathetic to this argument in principle because there are far 
more decisions and other materials worthy of attention than can possibly be 
covered in the typical, introductory Constitutional Law class.  Judgment calls 
must be made, and, as a general matter, I am not about to be critical of how 
different instructors make those calls.  But Gibbons provides a special case in 
my view for reasons that are tied to my conception of a good Constitutional 
Law class and the role of doctrine in it. 
Obviously, the teaching of doctrine is a critical part of any law class—new 
lawyers must know what the law is—but doctrine cannot be the exclusive 
focus of a Constitutional Law course.  Constitutional law is not static; rather, it 
is in constant flux as the Supreme Court modifies and tweaks doctrinal rules.  
Sometimes that tweaking is incremental in scope and glacial in pace; other 
times it is revolutionary and abrupt.69  Either way, the legal rule announced 
today may not be the rule a year from now and is almost assuredly not going to 
be the rule a generation or two hence (by which time the Court will have 
supplanted today’s rule with another). 
It is precisely because constitutional law is in continual development that 
new lawyers must know not only what the law is but also how to critically 
analyze that law, assessing its strengths and weaknesses on a variety of 
metrics.  How does that rule cohere with the constitutional text?  Our history?  
The constitutional structure?  What are the alternatives?  How do they compare 
when judged by these same criteria?  The task confronting the modern 
constitutional lawyer is not the self-evident, mechanical application of some 
pre-ordained, incontestable legal rule to a new set of facts—such cases, if they 
 
 69. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567–68 (1995) (invalidating 
congressional statute as beyond scope of commerce power for the first time in more than half a 
century). 
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occur at all, are rare.  Rather, it is to challenge (or defend) the relevance and/or 
propriety of applying a given rule to the type of legal dispute at hand: does the 
proffered rule apply in this situation, and, if so, does that rule reflect the right 
interpretation of the underlying constitutional provision?  Stated more 
abstractly, the key disputes in constitutional cases are interpretive in nature. 
Of course, no one disputes the need to teach law students how to pierce the 
doctrinal veil—to think, as we like to say, like lawyers.  But what does that 
have to do with the dormant Commerce Clause and Gibbons?  Two things, 
both of which point to the final reasons for restoring Gibbons.  First, the 
dormant Commerce Clause provides an excellent, largely apolitical platform 
for exposing students to the continual reshaping of constitutional law.  In fact, 
since its inception, dormant Commerce Clause doctrine has undergone 
virtually continual revision.70  Asked to juxtapose Gibbons with the modern 
doctrine, students are astounded at the extent to which the doctrine and its 
justification have changed over the past century and three quarters.  To be sure, 
other doctrinal areas have undergone substantial revisions over time—few, if 
any, have not—but the interpretive changes in the dormant Commerce Clause 
area are less obviously tied to instrumental, partisan concerns about the 
legislation at issue.  For example, students, at least initially, are prone to see 
the evolution of substantive due process doctrine in political terms; in their 
view, the Court’s differing positions as to the constitutionality of social welfare 
legislation from Lochner v. New York71 to Nebbia v. New York72 reflected the 
partisan biases of the justices on those Courts.  In contrast, the changes in the 
dormant Commerce Clause are not nearly so susceptible to this jaundiced, 
political view of constitutional adjudication.  Rather, the doctrinal changes at 
work in the dormant Commerce Clause are comparatively apolitical in nature; 
 
 70. Cooley recast the critical inquiry as whether the contested measure addressed matters of 
“national” or “local” importance.  See supra note 59.  Ensuing decisions refocused the inquiry on 
whether the contested measure related to “commerce” or some other form of economic activity.  
See, e.g., Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 183 (1868) (holding that insurance is not 
commerce and that, therefore, state insurance regulation does not violate the dormant Commerce 
Clause); Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1, 20 (1888) (holding that manufacturing is not commerce and 
that, therefore, state prohibition of the manufacture of alcoholic beverages does not violate the 
dormant Commerce Clause).  That inquiry, in turn, gave way during the New Deal to the 
Southern Pacific balancing test, according to which the challenged state regulation’s impact upon 
interstate commerce was weighed against the local benefit sought to be obtained by the 
regulation.  S. Pac. Co. v. State of Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 770–71 (1945).  
Needless to say, this balancing test seemed to turn upon fairly fine, perhaps even arbitrary, 
distinctions.  Compare id. at 781–82 (invalidating state law limiting length of trains to fourteen 
passenger cars or seventy freight cars), with S. Carolina State Highway Dep’t v. Barnwell Bros., 
Inc., 303 U.S. 177 (1938) (upholding state law limiting width of semi-trailer trucks to ninety 
inches).  Not surprisingly, that test in turn gave way to the modern, anti-protectionist doctrine. 
 71. 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidating maximum-hour limitation for bakers). 
 72. 291 U.S. 502 (1934) (upholding minimum-price requirement for milk producers). 
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the choice between Cooley’s “national/local” rule versus the Southern Pacific 
balancing test has yet to trigger a bitter, partisan debate among my law 
students, and I doubt it will yours.  Thus, the dormant Commerce Clause 
serves as a particularly good doctrinal area to demonstrate that constitutional 
doctrine is in continual flux, and for reasons other than ideological 
partisanship. 
Second, and more importantly, the Rehnquist Court has shown some 
interest in rethinking the dormant Commerce Clause.  While no dramatic 
upheaval has taken place as of yet, several justices have publicly called for a 
wholesale reappraisal of the doctrine.73  It is precisely at these potentially 
revolutionary moments that there is the greatest need for a comprehensive 
understanding of the theoretical and historical foundations for the doctrine.  
The lawyers of tomorrow may be asked not only whether the particular state 
tax or regulation at issue is discriminatory but what basis there is for the courts 
to continue to police state and local measures for compliance with the dormant 
Commerce Clause and whether those reasons extend to the situation at hand.  
Gibbons alone cannot provide a conclusive answer to those questions any more 
than it could or did in antebellum America, but the future lawyers of the 
twenty-first century can only be helped by knowing Chief Justice Marshall’s 
answer. 
CONCLUSION 
Gibbons and its exclusivity theory are not the magic keys by which to 
unlock the mysteries of the dormant Commerce Clause.  By the same token, 
however, neither are H.P. Hood and its anti-protectionist account of the 
Clause.  Both theories have much to be said in their favor.  For too long, 
however, we have emphasized the latter and virtually ignored the former.  It is 
high time to acknowledge that anti-protectionism is not the only plausible 
theoretical foundation for the dormant Commerce Clause.  It is high time to 
restore Gibbons to the Constitutional Law canon. 
 
 
 73. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
